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APPENDIX A
Harvard College and Massachusetts General Hospital v. Francis Amory
26 Mass. 446, 9 Pick. 446 (1830)

Decided March 1830
Putnam J. delivered the opinion of the Court. The confidence which the testator reposed
in his executors, whom he also constituted his trustees, was unbounded. He directed that
they, as trustees, should not be required to give any other security than their own bond,
without sureties, and that each of them should be accountable “simply for his own acts,
doings and defaults as such trustee.”
The general question is, whether the trustees have abused the trust.
The testator made provision for the support of his wife mainly from the proceeds
of the trust fund. He speaks of the profits, income, dividends, which were to come from
it through their hands. They were to lend the $50,000 upon ample and sufficient security,
or invest the same in safe and productive stock, either in the public funds, bank shares or
other stock, according to their best judgment and discretion.
It is very clear that the testator did not intend to limit the income to the simple
interest of the fund; for it he had so intended, he would not have spoken of dividends and
profits but would have given an annuity of three thousand dollars a year.
It has been argued that the testator gave the sum of fifty thousand dollars as the
trust fund, and that the trustees could only have demanded that sum of the executors. But
we think that no important inference can be drawn from that fact. It would not follow
from thence, that there should have been a sale of the personal property or stocks of the
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testator and a reinvestment. The trustees and the, [sic] executors were the same persons,
and instead of going through the useless formality of a sale and investment, it was clearly
competent for them to select from the ample funds of the estate, those stocks which
should form the capital of the trust fund. And in making that selection, it is very clear to
us, that they should have preferred that stock which would probably give her the most
profit, and at the same time preserve the value of the capital sum. It would not, for
example, have been the exercise of a sound discretion, to have appropriated the trust fund
in the stock of an incorporated company which gave great dividends for the time being,
but which would, according to the terms of its charter, expire as soon as the death of the
wife could be calculated to happen. In such a case nothing would be left of the capital for
those in remainder. On the other hand, if the investment of the trust fund were in stock
which made large dividends, and which had acquired its value by the prudent
management of its proprietors, and might be reasonably calculated upon as a safe and
permanent capital, such an investment would seem to be according to the manifest intent
of the testator.
It is somewhat remarkable that the testator did not himself appropriate the stock
of which the trust fund should consist, but that he should have left the selection to his
trustees. But as it would have been necessary to empower them to change, sell out and
reinvest, perhaps it was wise in the testator to leave the whole matter, the selection as
well as the management, to them. Be that as it may, he has given them that authority.
But it has happened that the value of the capital stock in which the trust fund was
invested, has fallen, and those in remainder call upon the trustees to make up the
deficiency.

2

Appendix 1: Harvard College v. Amory (1830)

It was said by Lord Hardwicke in Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Atk. 514, that “to compel
trustees to make up a deficiency not owing to their willful default, is the harshest demand
that can be made in a court of equity.” The statute of Geo. 1. for the indemnity of
guardians and trustees, provides that if there be a diminution of the principal, without the
default of the trustees, they shall not be liable. If that were otherwise, who would
undertake such hazardous responsibility?
It is argued for the appellants, that the trustees have not lent the money on good
security. The answer is found in the authority which the testator gave to them. They
were to lend, or to invest the fund in stocks. They preferred the latter.
But it is argued, that they did not invest in the public funds, bank shares or other
stock, within the true intent and meaning of the authority, but in trading companies and
so exposed the capital to great loss. And we are referred to Trafford v. Boehm, 3 Atk.
444, to prove the position, that such an investment will not have the support of a court of
chancery. The chancellor seems to suppose that funds or other good securities, must be
such as have the engagement of the government to pay off their capital. Bank stock, as
well as South-sea stock, which were in the management of directors, &c. were not
considered by that court as good security. But no such rule has ever been recognized
here. In point of fact, there has been as great fluctuation in the value of the stock which
was secured by the promise and faith of the government, as of the stock of banks. And
besides, the testator himself considers that bank shares might be a safe object of
investment, --“safe and productive stock.” And yet bank shares may be subject to losses
which may sweep away their whole value. Lord Hardwicke considers that South-sea
annuities and bank annuities stand upon different footing, because the directors have
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nothing to do with the principal, and are only to pay the interest, until the government pay
off the capital, and therefore that they only are properly good securities.
This reasoning has very little or no application here; for, in the first place, the
stocks depending upon the promise of the government, or, as they are called, the public
funds, are exceedingly limited in amount, compared with the amount of trust funds to be
invested; and, in the second place, it may well be doubted, if more confidence should be
reposed in the engagements of the public, than in the promises and conduct of private
corporations which are managed by substantial and prudent directors. There is one
consideration much in favor of investing in the stock of private corporations. They are
amenable to the law. The holder may pursue his legal remedy and compel them or their
officers to do justice. But the government can only be supplicated.
It has been argued, that manufacturing and insurance stocks are not safe, because
the principal is at hazard. But this objection applies to bank shares, as well as to shares in
incorporated manufacturing and insurance companies. To a certain extent, each may be
considered as concerned or interested in trade. The bank deals in bills of exchange and
notes, and the value of its capital depends upon the solvency of its debtors. It may, for
example, very properly discount upon the responsibility of merchants of good credit at
the time, but who, before the maturity of their notes, become bankrupts from unavoidable
and unforeseen mercantile hazards. In this way a bank becomes indirectly interested in
navigation, trade and merchandise, to an extent very little, if any, short of the trade in
which manufacturing companies engage. The capital in both cases may be lost by the
conduct of those who direct their affairs, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable
prudence and discretion.
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In regard to insurance companies or incorporations, the capital seems, at first
view, to be exposed to greater risk, but it is believed that there has not been much, if any,
more fluctuation of the capital in those investments, than in incorporated companies for
banking or manufacturing purposes. If the insurance be so general as to embrace a fair
proportion of all the property at risk, it will generally yield a reasonable profit, and
preserve the capital entire.
It will not do to reject those stocks as unsafe, which are in the management of
directors whose well or ill directed measures may involve a total loss. Do what you will,
the capital is at hazard. If the public funds are resorted to, what becomes of the capital
when the credit of the government shall be so much impaired as it was at the close of the
last war?
Investments on mortgage of real estate are not always safe. Its value fluctuates
more, perhaps, than the capital of insurance stock.
Again, the title to real estate, after the most careful investigation, may be
involved, and ultimately fail, and so the capital, which was originally supposed to be as
firm as the earth itself, will be dissolved.
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself
faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence,
discretion and intelligence management their own affairs, not in regard to speculation but
in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as
well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.
But in the case at bar, the testator referred the management of this trust especially
to the judgment and discretion of the trustees whom he appointed; one of whom is the
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brother, and the other was the cousin of his wife, for whose support this provision was
made. These trustees are not to be made chargeable but for gross neglect and wilful
mismanagement.
The testator expressly authorized the trustees to invest in “other stock” than bank
shares or the public funds; so they might as well select other stock as that which the
testator named.
There can be no doubt but that shares in manufacturing and insuring
incorporations are and were commonly called and known by the name of stock. The
investment would therefore be clearly within the letter of the authority.
It has been argued, “that the trustees should have invested in safe and productive
stock, at their own and a sound discretion, without being governed by the known opinion
of the testator” “that he was at liberty to speculate, but the trustees were not.” If these
positions should be granted, the desired inference would not follow. If the testator, for
example, had been in the habit of dealing largely in lotteries and games of hazard, it
would undoubtedly not have justified the trustees in making such investments,
notwithstanding the testator had been the favorite of fortune. But if the testator had
invested his funds to remain permanently in any stock, that circumstance might well be
taken into consideration by the trustees when called to exercise their own bet skill and
discretion. They might reasonable and properly inquire and consider what their testator
would do in the circumstances in which they were placed. Would he recommend an
investment that should give simple interest on a loan, or in stock that would probably
give much more, and yet have the principal sum reasonably safe?

6

Appendix 1: Harvard College v. Amory (1830)

The circumstance of the trustees’ reposing confidence where the testator had, is
one which is always to be considered as tending properly to their discharge. Thompson v.
Brown, 4 Johns. Ch.R. 628. The case of Rowth v. Howell, 3 Ves. jun. 565, has a strong
bearing upon this part of the case. There the testator, having great confidence in his
banker, recommended it to his executors not to be in a hurry to withdraw the funds from
him. But after the death of the testator, the banker misapplied them, and probably stung
by remorse on account of his fraud, he committed suicide. It was urged against the
executors, that they might have withdrawn the securities from the banker, and they had
time enough to do so; but it was considered that the loss arose from the confidence
originally reposed in the banker by the testator, and the executors were not subjected to
the loss.
In the case at bar, the testator was a man of extraordinary forecast and discretion,
in regard to the management of his property. His vast accumulation could not be ascribed
to accidental causes, but to calculation and reflection. The fact that he had within three or
four years invested nearly half his property in manufacturing stock, was entitled to great
consideration and respect, and would, without any change of circumstances, have a
strong tendency to justify the selection of the manufacturing stock as part of the trust
fund.
We cannot think with the counsel for the appellants, that the dividend of fourteen
per cent arising from the recovery of the claim against the Spanish government can be
considered as part of the capital. It was received in the nature of salvage which is always
divided as profits, and not treated as part of the capital stock.
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And we do not think that the negotiations between the Boston Manufacturing
company and the Merrimack Manufacturing company, in relation to making a large
quantity of machinery, and the sale of patents and of patterns for castings, by the Boston
Manufacturing to the Merrimack Manufacturing company, should be considered as part
of the capital stock. We have seen no evidence that they were ever treated as such by the
proprietors. We think the sums arising from those causes were properly considered as the
fruits of their industry, and placed to the account of profit and loss of the Boston
Manufacturing Company.
It is proved or admitted, that the stock which the trustees selected to constitute the
trust fund of $50,000, was of that value when it was taken by them.
We are of opinion that they had a right to select the stock which they did for that
purpose, and that they acted in the premises according to their best skill and discretion.
And we have not seen any evidence which would satisfy us, that under all the
circumstances of the case, they did not act with a sound discretion in making the selection
and investment.
But if we were less clear than we are upon that point, we are of opinion that this
whole matter has been settled in the court of probate, where the appellants had notice to
attend, and where all objections were raised and considered. The judge thereupon made a
decree, from which there has not been any appeal.
We say the whole matter, because the executors and the trustees are the same
persons. On February 9th, 1824, the executors, after due notice to all persons interested,
presented their account with the estate, and appropriated the stock which should
constitute the fund of $50,000 selected by them as trustees for Mrs. M’Lean. The
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Massachusetts General Hospital was heard in fact, and (as has been said and not denied)
the objections were made by the same able and learned counsel who now appears in their
behalf. And upon the hearing, the judge of probate allowed the account. There was no
appeal from that settlement. By the legal operation of that settlement, the trustees
became chargeable with that selected trust fund, and it is not now competent for the
appellants to contend that those stocks were not legally appropriated by the executors and
received by the trustees, as the fund of $50,000 given by the testator. If the college had
any objections, they should have made them. Probably every objection to the account
which could have been made by the college was in fact made by the hospital.
It has been argued that the account which was settled and acquiesced in, was
rendered by the executors and not by the trustees, and ought not to bar this process, which
is against the surviving trustee. But it was a settlement of the very root and substance of
this controversy. The executors announced their selection and appropriation of the stock
for the fund. The trustees (being the same persons) became instantly chargeable with the
management of it. It is the original misappropriation and selection which is the subject of
complaint. Suppose the trustees had not been the executors, and that the college and the
hospital had requested the executors to deliver to the other persons as trustees the
particular stock to constitute the trust fund; could those institutions object again the
trustees, that those stocks did not constitute a proper fund? It would seem clear that the
trustees might justify. They would say to the two institutions, “you acquiesced in the
appropriation by the executors, and we also thought it advisable, safe and expedient.”
We think that that matter having been settled by a court of competent jurisdiction,
without appeal, the decree is final and conclusive.
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The college and the hospital were especially put upon their guard; for the
executors, in their letter of December 27th, 1823, informed their committee, that they
should be duly notified when these accounts should be presented for allowance at the
probate office, that they might object to any arrangements which the executors might
have made for the capital of the $50,000. As no appeal was made from the decree of the
probate court, all parties in interest must be presumed to have acquiesced in the
arrangements which were then made for the capital of the trust fund of $50,000. If there
had been an appeal, it would probably have been heard and determined before there was
any depreciation upon the whole investment. Indeed it appears from the evidence, that
the stock of the Merrimack Manufacturing company advanced twenty per cent from the
time when the stock was selected in February 1824, to December 1st, 1825.
The claim now made upon the trustees, to make up the subsequent depreciation,
would seem to be justified only on the ground of gross abuse of their trust, even if it were
not barred by the decreed in the probate court from which no appeal was made. But upon
examining all the documents and evidence, it seems to us that there is no reason whereon
to ground that imputation.
Trustees are justly and uniformly considered favorably, and it is of great
importance to bereaved families and orphans, that they should not be held to make good,
losses in the depreciation of stocks or the failure of the capital itself, which they held in
trust, provided they conduct themselves honestly and discreetly and carefully, according
to the existing circumstances, in the discharge of their trusts. If this were held otherwise,
no prudent man would run the hazard of losses which might happen without any neglect
or breach of good faith.
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The judgment of this Court is, that the decree of the probate court, from which the
appellants appealed, be, and it is hereby affirmed; and that the record be remitted to that
court for further proceedings according to law to be there had; and that the appellee
recover his costs.
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